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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
TERRY L. HAY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900457 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3 )(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) and Rule 
26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, wherein a defendant in 
a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Supreme 
Court from a final order involving a conviction of a first degree 
felony. Mr. Hay was convicted of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree, a first degree felony in violation of §76-5-203, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendantf s motion for 
a mistrial based on: 
a) ineffective assistance of counsel 
and/or 
b) prosecutorial misconduct? 
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2. Was counsel ineffective in allowing gruesome details into 
evidence which may have inflamed the jury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues #l(a) and 2 regarding ineffectiveness presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P. 2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990)(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. 
Ct. 2052; 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974). See also State v. Johnson, 176 
Ut. Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Questions of law can be 
independently reviewed (See Templin at 187). Questions of fact 
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (Id at 187). 
Issue #l(b), prosecutorial misconduct presents a question of 
law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 
159 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7, 16 N.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE, RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to 
the disposition of the appeal are set forth in the text of the 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against Terry 
L. Hay for one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the second 
degree, a first degree felony. 
A jury found Mr. Hay guilty on July 14, 1990, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
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the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. The final 
judgment and conviction was rendered on June 17, 1991, whereby 
defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State 
Prison of 5 years to life. 
Trial counsel withdrew for purposes of appeal based on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. New counsel was appointed 
to prepare and submit the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 27, 1989, defendant Terry L. Hay, and the victim, Lony 
Crosby, went to Wales, Utah, in Sanpete County and stayed with 
Lony's grandparents. They spent the next few days working for a 
family friend and hunting and walking in the nearby mountains. 
During that time, according to Arlene Crosby, Lony's grandmother, 
there appeared to be no friction or arguments between the two boys. 
(T. Vol. II, p. 244). 
On Wednesday, July 31, 1989, the two went into the mountains 
shortly after lunchtime. A while later, John Crosby Sr. heard what 
he said sounded like two gunshots in rapid succession. Later that 
afternoon, defendant came down the mountain alone and gathered some 
of his items from the Crosby trailer. Arlene inquired as to the 
whereabouts of Lony. Defendant responded that Lony was still on 
the mountain preparing for their dinner. The Crosby's did not see 
Lony nor the defendant again. (T.Vol II, p. 245-247.) 
Jennifer Bratt testified that, in the late evening of August 
1, 1989, defendant came to her home dirty, upset and shaken. 
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Defendant told her that he had been hit on the head by Lony and, 
when he awakened, Lony was gone. He surmised Lony may have gone to 
Nevada to see a girlfriend. (T. Vol. II. p. 270-272) 
On August 2, 1989, defendant went to the home of Lony's mother 
and stepfather. Defendant told Mrs. Crosby that Lony had stolen a 
truck in Wales, and they returned to Salt Lake City. Defendant 
said Lony then left. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 319-323.) 
On the morning of August 2, 1989, defendant spoke with a 
friend, Travis Pearce. Travis said defendant appeared shaken and 
nervous. Defendant told Travis that he had been asleep and, when 
he awoke, Lony was gone. He also told Pearce that he stole a truck 
in Wales to return to Murray. (T. Vol. III. p. 401-404). 
Lony's mother and stepfather asked a friend who was a police 
officer to question defendant about Lony. Defendant told the 
officer, Paul Pelch, that Lony had asked him to not reveal his 
whereabouts, but that Lony was in Reno, Nevada. Defendant also 
said that he had heard from Lony (T. Vol. Ill p. 340-344). 
During the period of Lony's absence from August 1, 1989, until 
his body was found on December 31, 1989, defendant told people that 
he had been in contact with Lony. 
Crosby's family filed a missing person report on approximately 
August 4, 1989. Defendant was again questioned regarding the last 
time he saw Lony, and his response was the same. (T. Vol. III. 
p.324. ) 
On December 31, 1989, two hunters found a decomposed body, 
which was later identified as Lony Crosby, at Utah Lake in Utah 
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County. 
Once the body was identified, defendant was questioned by Utah 
County detectives* He admitted shooting Lony and disposing of his 
body in Utah County at Utah Lake; however, he stated the killing 
was in self-defense as Lony had attacked him with a knife that had 
a black handle with red trim. He said the killing occurred in 
Murray, Utah in Salt Lake County (T. Vol. I p. 34-40). Detective 
Jeff Anderson with Murray Police Department took over the 
questioning. Again, defendant made statements implicating himself 
in the shooting but asserting self-defense. 
Defendant told Detective Anderson that Lony had had a 
girlfriend, Jennifer Bratt, who was also seeing defendant. Lony 
confronted defendant regarding this and Lony came after him with 
the above-described knife. Defendant described becoming very 
frightened and shot at Lony in self defense. He said he threw 
Lony's personal items and the black handled knife in a nearby 
river. (T. Vol. I. pp. 75-81.) 
At trial, defendant testified that the shooting occurred in 
Wales, Utah, up in the mountains by the trailer home belonging to 
Lony's grandparents. He said he took all of Lony's items down the 
mountain except for the red trimmed, black handled knife Lony used 
to attack him, which he threw south from the campsite where the 
shooting occurred. (T. Vol.1, III, page 449). He also testified 
that he tried to hide Lony's body in a fire pit. Defendant said he 
alone stole the truck from Wales, left it on a Salt Lake City road, 
and anonymously contacted police as to its whereabouts. (T. Vol. I, 
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III. P„ 449-451 )o Several weeks later, he returned to the mountain 
in Wales and moved Lony's remains to the site where it was later 
located. (T. Vol. Ill p. 457-459). In all his statements to 
detectives and at trial, defendant asserted the killing was in 
self-defense. 
During the trial, testimony by detectives regarding the search 
of the campsite area on the mountain indicated a number of items 
were found and marked for evidence, including an old knife with a 
black taped handle. At trial, the State moved to introduce that 
knife into evidence over defense objections of relevance, since it 
did not match defendant's description of the knife Lony used 
against him. (T. Vol. I,, p. 90) 
After the case was submitted to the jury for deliberations, 
defense counsel noticed the knife with a black handle and red trim 
in the prosecutor's briefcase. Counsel made a motion for a 
mistrial on the grounds that (1) the existence of the knife should 
have been provided in discovery; (2) if the knife was part of the 
discovery, defense counsel was ineffective as she was proceeding 
under the assumption that no such knife was found; and (3) in any 
event, the State's action of introducing into evidence the black 
knife had the effect of misleading the jury regarding the existence 
of the actual knife defendant described, especially since the State 
actually did have the knife, which would corroborate defendant's 
testimony, but chose not to introduce it. (T. Vol. IV p. 592-597). 
The court denied the motion, asserting that the corrective 
measures taken by the court were sufficient to remove any 
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prejudice. Defense counsel disagreed and renewed her motion for 
mistrial, which was again denied. (T. Vol. IV p. 598-600.) The 
court "cured" the problem by submitting the knife to the jury along 
with a brief statement from each side as to its importance. (T. 
Vol IV, P. 603-604) 
Prior to trial, defendant moved the court to exclude evidence 
regarding transportation of the victim's corpse by defendant on the 
grounds that (1) such evidence was not relevant to the 
determination of guilt; and (2) any probative value of such 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice and confusion of the jury. That motion was denied on a 
limited point of relevance, but the court indicated that if the 
State got into gruesome aspects of the movement of the body, its 
ruling would be otherwise. (T. Supp. p. 14-22) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At trial, the defendant claimed that he killed Lony Crosby in 
self-defense. The knife that he claimed Crosby attacked him with 
was recovered. Another knife, apparently unrelated to the case, 
was admitted as evidence by the state over the objection of 
defendant. Defense counsel conducted the defense and cross 
examination while apparently under the impression that the knife 
defendant described was not available. 
After the jury went into deliberation, defense counsel noticed 
the knife that defendant had described was in the prosecutor's 
briefcase. Defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial claiming 
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that she was ineffective for not realizing the knife was available 
and not using it as an integral part of her defense, or 
alternatively that the prosecutor committed misconduct by hiding it 
and misleading the jury. The prosecutor explained that he did not 
introduce that knife because he felt he could not lay adequate 
foundation for its admissability. The motion was denied and the 
Court attempted to "cure" the problem. The knife was presented to 
the jury, during deliberations along with a very brief statement 
from each party regarding its evidentiary significance. 
Counsel was also ineffective in allowing testimony and 
argument regarding some gruesome details involving the 
transportation of the body, after having secured a ruling that such 
details would be inadmissible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
MISTRIAL BASED ON; a) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
a) Defendant contends the court erred in not granting his 
motion for a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Ordinarily claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; 
however, in some circumstances the claim may be raised on direct 
appeal. State v. Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Those circumstances exist when the defendant is represented 
by new counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the 
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issue* Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F. 2d 125, 
133-434 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. The 
circumstances are present for this Court to review the 
ineffectiveness claim raised in this case on direct appeal. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. An infraction of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel can never be treated as harmless error. Johnson, 176 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 19, (Citing Halloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 So 
Ct. 1173 (1978), see also State v. Velarde, 806 P 2d 1190 (Ut. App. 
1991). 
In ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts have adopted the two-
part test of Strickland; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counself s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687; see also State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). The purpose of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel seeks to "guarantee an effective advocate for 
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each criminal defendant." Johnson, 176 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 19 (citing 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988). 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective, her 
performance deficient and that serious errors were made in 
conducting his defense, such that it prejudiced the defense, 
depriving defendant of a fair trial. Counsel admitted as much in 
her motion for a mistrial. 
The following exchanges took place when counsel discovered the 
prosecutor had the knife: 
THE COURT: The State of Utah versus Terry Hay. 
Defendant is present, along with his counsel. 
Prosecution is present. It is 2:40 The jury has been 
deliberating about an hour. I was notified by a knock on 
the door that counsel for the defendant wanted to have 
the benefit of the records for a motion. Go ahead. 
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, we would have a motion 
for mistrial, if I may state what occurred. 
After the jury was excused I discovered the Mr. 
Behrens had in his briefcase the knife with the black 
handle and the red trim that was described by the 
defendant during the course of his testimony. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Do you want to unshackle 
the defendant? 
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: Fine. 
MS. PALACIOS: I was advised that this was provided 
to me in the police reports. Quite frankly, I can't 
dispute that at this point whether or not they were in 
the police reports. If they were in the police reports, 
then I believe that I would simply raise the issue for 
appeal purposes on the grounds of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, because in my obvious haste to prepare for 
the trial -- I was sick for three days, and prepared over 
weekend -- I did not catch the fact that that knife 
existed, which would corroborate my client's story . . . 
(T. Vol IV p. 592-593) . . . I want to make it clear that 
the knife -- I'm not alleging that they hid it from me. 
To thcit extent I take responsibility. As I said, I think 
that I was ineffective not to do it. . . . (Id at p. 
594). 
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. . .Mr. Scowcroft points out that we did not know that 
the knife existed. However, as I was -- I can't remember 
where it was in the record. I can't remember if it was 
in the reports. They have represented to me that it was. 
I did not get the knife. I wasn't shown the knife, and 
I missed out on that part. . . (Id at 595). 
In fact, during the preliminary hearing, counsel cross 
examined Officer Anderson about the "knives" that were found. 
Anderson said he had found a fixed blade knife. Prelim. T. p. 79 -
84. Certainly counsel should have been aware of the knife. 
The first prong of the Strickland test is met where counsel 
failed to discover a material piece of evidence around which to 
fashion a defense. Counsel was deficient since the evidence was 
critical and available. The error was serious because the evidence 
had the potential value of strongly corroborating defendant's 
claims of self defense and boasting his credibility. The error was 
prejudicial because it weakened and altered the defense. 
For example, without the knife, counsel was forced to confront 
what the prosecution portrayed to be just another lie told by the 
defendant, i.e., that the victim even had a knife, much less that 
the victim attacked him with it; the prosecutor's medical 
testimony implied that the victim was not moving when shot. With 
the knife, the defense could have developed a sounder theory of how 
the wounds could have occurred if Crosby were indeed attacking with 
a knife. Instead of having to speculate about an attack, and the 
possibilities thereupon, counsel could have had a sound basis from 
which to argue an attack and self defense. With the knife, counsel 
could and should have focused more on the scene, examined it more, 
developed it more. This would quite probably have enhanced 
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defendant's credibility as well as corroborating his account of the 
incident. In short, counsel would not have given the scene and the 
attack such short shrift. That piece of evidence was critical to 
defendant's defense. It was the only physical evidence that could 
help the defendant. Counsel's examination of the defendant was 
affected by that lack of evidence. Counsel's argument was weakened 
without that evidence. She noted that the knife had not been 
found. (T. Vol. IV, p. 576). Defendant's entire defense was 
compromised and altered because of the missing evidence. 
It weis easier for the State as well, in disputing all the 
defendant's claims that he was attacked with a knife. 
The "cure" administered by the trial court did not remedy the 
situation. It was like a band-aid on a torn jugular. Even though 
the jury got to see the knife, and in spite of having counsel (over 
objection) submit a "brief" statement of its evidentiary value, 
this was all too little, too late. The defense had already been 
compromised. Who can say what effect receiving the knife in such 
an odd way had on the jury? It surely only confused them, since 
counsel had told them in closing that the knife had not been found. 
Certainly a "dispassionate" reading of the stipulation accompanying 
the exhibit was of no benefit to defendant. (See T. Vol. IV p. 599) 
A three sentence statement by the defense as to its evidentiary 
value was hardly sufficient to emphasize it importance. (See T. 
Vol. IV. p. 604) 
Defendant contends that counsel's ineffectiveness in failing 
to discover and use the knife to fashion his defense served to 
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compromise his defense, to his prejudice. He asks this Court to 
find his counsel was ineffective and reverse his conviction and 
grant him a new trial. 
b) THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT BY 
WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE AND MISLEADING THE JURY. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not granting 
his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
which deprived defendant of due process by his concealing and 
withholding from evidence the knife described by defendant. The 
prosecutor instead introduced an unrelated knife. This had the 
effect of misleading the jury. The concealment and withholding of 
the knife was deliberate, based on where it was located -- in the 
prosecutor's briefcase, not with the other evidence in boxes and 
bags. 
Once it became obvious that defense counsel did not know that 
the knife was available, which was during opening argument, the 
prosecutor had a duty to reveal it. Instead, the prosecutor 
conducted his case in chief and cross examination of the defendant 
as if the knife did not exist. He argued through inference and 
omission that there was no knife. 
"Well, the investigation continued and soon 
they found evidence in Sanpete County. They 
found this wood and these shell casings and 
the shallow hole . . . (T. Vol. 10, P. 564) 
Defendant contends his due process rights were violated by the 
State's failure to produce the knife for admission into evidence at 
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his trial. He argues that the knife was material to his case and 
his defense and that there was a reasonable possibility that its 
timely introduction would have tended to exculpate him and that it 
would have had a significant impact on his defense as well as on 
the jury. 
In State v. Stewart 544 P 2d. 477 (Utah 1975), this Court 
stated that a "deliberate suppression of evidence by those charged 
with the prosecution . . . constitutes a denial of due process if 
the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant 
in a criminal case. . . " Id at 479 (emphasis added). See also 
State v. Lovato, 702 P 2d 6106 (Utah 1985) and State v. Jimenez, 
761 P 2d 577 (Utah 1988). That proposition was clarified in State 
v. Nebeker 657 P 2d 1359 (Utah 1983), where the Court said: 
"The materiality required to reverse a 
criminal conviction for suppression or 
destruction of evidence as a denial of due 
process is more than evidentiary materiality." 
Id. at 1363. Rather, it must be "material in 
the constitutional sense." Id. (emphasis 
added). Constitutional materiality requires 
that there be a showing that the suppressed or 
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of 
whether the defendant is guilty of the charge 
and whether there is a fundamental unfairness 
that requires the Court to set aside the 
defendant's conviction. Id. 
The Court noted that evidence that only "might" have helped 
the defense does not establish constitutional materiality. 
Defendant contends the knife was vital to his claim of self defense 
since it was the very object that he claimed to have been attacked 
with and that he defended himself from. Defendant contends this 
evidence qualifies as material in the constitutional sense. As 
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argued in point (a) above, his entire defense and trial strategy 
was compromised by its unavailability. The state took advantage of 
its own misdeed by conducting its case as if the knife did not 
exist, which was dishonest and which misled the jury. Defendant 
argues that this violates due process and fundamental fairness. 
Regardless of whether defense counsel forgot about the knife 
or not, the prosecutor should have revealed it. He argued that he 
did not introduce it based on foundational concerns (T. Vol. IV p. 
596. ) He did not mention why he did not say anything about having 
it there in case defense counsel wanted it introduced and/or would 
stipulate to its foundation. 
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980) this court 
addressed the question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose 
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case. The factors 
noted by the Court included the nature of the evidence, whether the 
defendant had made a specific request for the evidence . 
whether the defendant knew or with reasonable diligence should have 
known about the evidence and to a certain extent, the conduct of 
the prosecution. Id at 224. 
"The underlying concern is, of course, to 
make the judicial process a search for truth 
and not just an arena of competition between 
the prosecution and the defense. For that 
reason the adversarial process, which 
generally serves well the judicial process, 
must yield to the quest for truth, if there is 
a conflict. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and 
this Court have dealt with the standards that 
would be applied in determining whether 
evidence should have been disclosed by the 
prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), 
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the Court held that the prosecutorial 
suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused, in the face of a specific request of 
the evidence violates due process if the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment. Good faith of the prosecution in 
such an instance is irrelevant. Accord, Moore 
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 
L. Ed. 2d 706 (1972). In Moonev v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 
(1935), the court first addressed the 
situation involving a prosecutor's use of 
testimony which he knows or should know is 
perjured. Decisions following Mooney have 
held that a conviction obtained by the knowing 
use of perjured testimony is fundamentally 
unfair and must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 
1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959). Apart from 
prosecutorial misconduct involving false 
testimony, nondisclosure resulting from the 
failure of the police or the members of the 
prosecutorial team to inform the defense 
attorney of exculpatory or other relevant 
evidence may also result in a violation of due 
process. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); 
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842 (4th Cir. 
1964). 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 
S. Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976), extended 
the rulings of Brady, Moore, and Moonev. 
Agurs concerned the duty of a prosecutor to 
disclose exculpatory evidence which is unknown 
and unrequested by the defendant. The Court 
held that a prosecutor has a constitutional 
duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory 
evidence and evidence that is "so clearly 
supportive of a claim of innocence that it 
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to 
produce," 427 U.S.at 197, 96 S. Ct. at 2399. 
Specifically, the Court held that due process 
is violated if the undisclosed evidence, had 
it been disclosed, would have created a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. 
Whether the evidence created a reasonable 
doubt must be evaluated in light of the entire 
record as viewed by an appellate court: 
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*If there is no reasonable doubt 
about guilt whether or not the 
additional evidence is considered, 
there is no justification for a new 
trial. On the other hand, if the 
verdict is already of questionable 
validity, additional evidence of 
relatively minor importance might be 
sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt. [Id. at 112-13, 96 S. Ct. at 
2402.] 
In State v. Worthen, 765 P 2d 839 (Utah 1988) the defendant 
had demanded all exculpatory and mitigatory evidence from the 
State. The court held that the prosecution has a duty to disclose 
such evidence [citing Brady, Jarrell U.C.A. Title 77, Chapter 35, 
Section 16(a)]. Indeed [that] due process requires the State to 
disclose even unrequested information which is or may be (emphasis 
added) exculpatory (citing State v. Carter 707 P. 2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985). A Brady request for information is deemed a continuing 
request. Id at 849. The Court further noted that a prosecutor has 
a high duty to act fairly in conducting a criminal prosecution Id. 
at 850. 
As noted, the prosecutor's good faith reason for not 
introducing the knife is of no consequence. He had a duty to 
voluntarily inform counsel that the knife was available even after 
trial commenced. Instead, he compromised the quest for truth and 
violated fundamental fairness by proceeding as if the knife had not 
been found. There is a substantial likelihood that the evidence 
affected the judgment of the jury. The way it was given to the 
jury, after deliberations began, with a brief explanation, had to 
have affected them. They deliberated for nine hours on Friday and 
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then returned on Saturday. (T. Vol IV. p. 609-610). In viewing 
the entire record as to the effect of the evidence, if introduced, 
there would have been a much stronger basis from which defendant 
could have argued self defense. It would have enhanced his 
credibility. This evidence was hardly of minor relative importance 
-- it was crucial. Defendant argues that the validity of the 
verdict should be questioned. Defendant argues that a duty to 
disclose was violated by the State, and it prejudiced his trial. 
Defendant submits that the Court erred in not granting his motion 
for mistrial. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the conviction 
based on prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of due process. 
POINT II 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING 
GRUESOME DETAILS INTO EVIDENCE 
Defendant contends his counsel's ineffectiveness further 
prejudiced his case when counsel allowed the State to present 
gruesome details that inflamed the jury, after the defense had 
secured a ruling that such evidence would be inadmissible. 
At a pretrial motion, the defense argued for exclusion of 
evidence concerning defendant's moving the victim's body, pursuant 
to Rules 401 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, (T. Supp. p. 14-22). 
The motion was denied on a limited point of relevance but the court 
indicated that "If we were to get into the issue of some gruesome 
aspects of the movement of the body, my ruling would be otherwise." 
(T. Supp. p. 22). This court has previously held that: 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a 
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tendency to influence the outcome of the trial 
by improper means, if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish or to 
otherwise cause the jury to base its decision 
on something other than the facts of the case. 
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst., 
605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaaas Cos., Inc., 678 
P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984); State v. Bartlev, 784 
P. 2d 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Defendant contends the evidence elicited by the prosecutor and 
not objected to by defense counsel regarding the movement of the 
body was unfairly prejudicial and inflamed the jury. Defendant 
contends that counsel was ineffective by allowing the evidence 
after the Court had indicated it would not allow it. 
At the start of trial, the prosecutor read a stipulation into 
the records that honored the Court's ruling on this matter. (T. Vol 
II, p. 5). On direct examination of the defendant, his counsel was 
careful to avoid any gruesome details about moving the body. On 
cross examination, the prosecutor established that the body had 
been decomposing for six weeks; that it was a terrible sight; a 
terrible smell, that it was in terrible condition; to a point where 
it would almost be falling apart at the various limbs; that [his] 
foot broke apart; take his foot out of the back [of the boot] by 
the sock; . . . lay the foot down on top of him; picked up a 
decomposing body . . . that the body was just dumped out of the 
back of the truck covered with garbage (T. Vol. 111. p.488-492). 
The prosecutor even read the following stipulation into evidence: 
"It is stipulated that when the remains 
of Lony Crosby were located that his sock was 
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located on top of his torso near the 
shoulders. Inside the sock were the remains 
of his right foot. (T. Vol IV p. 534) 
Counsel failed to object to any of this inflammatory evidence 
and even stipulated to some of it. The only purpose the State had 
for eliciting it was to appeal to, and arouse the jury's sense of 
horror. The trial court had already ruled that such details would 
be inadmissible and counsel still failed to object to it. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was highly inflammatory in the 
eyes of the jury. See State v. Maurer, 770 P. 2d 981 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant submits that counsel? s deficient performance served 
to prejudice his trial. Counsel allowed inadmissible, inflammatory 
evidence to taint the jury. Counsel asks this court to find his 
counsel was deficient and to grant him a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully asks the 
Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case back to the 
District Court for a new trial. 
Dated this / <T day of J^nJ^QrvJud^, 1992. 
0 
MANNir GARCIA", 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waster of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
APPENDIX B 
Constitution of the United States 
AMENDMENT VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
